Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

This paper presents a dual intention model (DIM) of demonstrations as actions to show the agentive nature of demonstrations. According to the DIM, demonstrations are complex actions that contain as components at least three elements: an abductive intention, a deictic intention, and a basic ostensive act of indication. This paper unpacks these three components and discusses their roles from the viewpoint of the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language. It also shows how the DIM applies in selected practical (...) examples and explains the merits of the model in the context of other views on demonstrations and demonstratives. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and (...) acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are introduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory. (shrink)

The strength of emotions in moral judgment and decision-making under risk The focus of this paper is the role of emotions in judgments and choices associated with moral issues. Study 1 shows that depending on the strength of emotions when making a moral decision, people become sensitive to the severity and the probability of harm that their decisions can bring to others. A possible interpretation is that depending on the strength of emotions, people in their moral judgments choose to be (...) either utilitarian or deontologist. In Study 2, following the priority heuristic model, we found that in situations in which the violation of moral norms does not evoke strong negative emotions, people are sensitive to quantitative risk parameters, and the decision-making process requires a relatively longer time. In moral situations in which a violation of the moral norm evokes strong emotions, decision-making is based on arguments other than quantitative risk parameters, and the process takes a shorter time. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to pose a problem for theories that claim that belief reports are context dependent. Firstly, I argue that the claim is committed to verbalism, a theory that derives the context sensitivity of belief reports from the context sensitivity of the psychological verbs used in such reports. Secondly, I argue that verbalism is not an attractive theoretical option because it is in conflict with the non-proto-rigidity of verbs like ‘believe’. Finally, I describe various consequences that (...) the argument has for invariantism and moderate contextualism. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to defend the view according to which all simple fictional sentences are meaningless. If their assertions seem to convey some truth evaluable information, and fictional sentences themselves seem to be true or false, it is because some pragmatic mechanisms are operative, enabling the expression of propositions not encoded in the semantic content of these sentences. According to some theorists, the mechanisms responsible for that process are the same as those responsible for generating conversational implicatures. (...) I argue against that claim and maintain that to comprehend the information conveyed by a fictional assertion, one must determine what kind of fictional assertion it is and only then apply the relevant interpretative rule adjusted to the fictional sentence used in that act. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

Keith DeRose zauważył, że niezmienności kontekstowej atrybucji wiedzy można bronić za pomocą tzw. manewru z zasadnej stwierdzalności. Stosujący ten manewr inwariantyści (jak np. Tim Black) utrzymują, że wartość logiczna określonej atrybucji wiedzy nie zmienia się wraz ze zmianą kontekstu jej asercji; może się jednak zmieniać to, co takie asercje konwersacyjnie implikują, skutkując poczuciem, że zmienia się wartość logiczna samej atrybucji. Z podobnym manewrem mamy do czynienia w innych sporach filozoficznych. Niektórzy autorzy (m.in. Fred Adams) utrzymują, że zdania fikcjonalne pozbawione są (...) wartości logicznej; jeżeli zdania takie wydają się ją mieć, to tylko za sprawą tego, że wypowiadając takie zdania, implikuje się konwersacyjnie sądy logiczne. Inni badacze (Emery i Hill) argumentują, że za poczucie fałszywości nierzeczywistych okresów warunkowych z niemożliwym poprzednikiem odpowiedzialne są fałszywe implikatury konwersacyjne generowane przez asercje trywialnie prawdziwych zdań tego typu. Z kolei niektórzy, jak Alan Hazlett, twierdzą, że z éA wie, że pù nie wynika to, że p; ale to, że p jest jedynie implikaturą konwersacyjną takiej atrybucji wiedzy. Merytoryczna wartość tego rodzaju argumentacji zależy więc od tego, czy asercje rozważanych zdań rzeczywiście generują określone implikatury konwersacyjne. W pracy wykazałem, że można mieć co do tego wątpliwości. W tym celu identyfikuję i opisuję własność implikatur konwersacyjnych, której – jak pokazuję – nie mają jednak sądy mające być w opinii wspomnianych badaczy implikaturami konwersacyjnymi asercji rozważanych zdań. Własność ta polega na tym, że implikatura konwersacyjna jest wrażliwa na tzw. dociekliwe pytania rozstrzygnięcia – odpowiedź twierdząca na takie pytanie nie generuje implikatury konwersacyjnej, którą asercja takiego zdania mogłaby mieć w innym kontekście. (shrink)

The paper aims to add contextual dependence to the new directival theory of meaning, a functional role semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s directival theory of meaning. We show that the original formulation of the theory does not have a straight answer on how the meaning of indexicals and demonstratives is established. We illustrate it in the example of some problematic axiomatic and inferential directives containing indexicals. We show that the main reason why developing the new directival theory of meaning in (...) this direction is difficult is that the theory focuses on the notion of a sentence (and not the notion of an utterance). To add the latter notion to the theory, we introduce the idea of admissible contextual distribution being an interpretation of the hybrid expression view on indexicals and demonstratives. We argue that this idea introduces a small but important modification to the concept of language matrix and gives way to define two distinct concepts of meaning: for an expression type and for a use of an expression type. (shrink)

The paper is a reply to Leopold Hess' article "Proper Names - the Facts and the Myths". It is shown that the author misunderstood the issue of proper names and misconceived main ideas of the new theory of reference. The most important mistakes made by the author are: (i) considering the category of proper names in detachment from linguistic usage ;(ii) wrong reconstruction of the so-called modal argument and the notion of rigid designator; (iii) equivocating between two meanings of "a (...) priori". All those mistakes are carefully analysed. (shrink)

The main aim of the paper is to discuss some recent definitions of lie and lying, particularly that proposed recently in Edukacja Filozoficzna by Andrzej Stępnik. First I point out that his proposals share common conviction that among other things one has to have intention to deceive someone in order to lie. But this is wrong since it is quite clear that in a case of bold-face lies one can lie without having this intention. And bold-face lies are lies. It (...) follows that not only Stępnik’s definitions but all descriptive definitions of lies and lying sharing this condition are too narrow, so are inadequate. Instead of giving another descriptive definition of lying and lie, some précising definitions are proposed. According to first of them: A person x lies to y iff (i) x claims to y something that x doesn’t believe, and (ii) x doesn’t inform y that she doesn’t believe what she clams. According to another; A person x lies to y iff (i) by uttering something x expresses some propositional attitude (belief, desire, knowledge etc.), (ii) x doesn’t have this attitude, (ii) x doesn’t inform y that (ii) And the last states: A person x lies to y iff (i) x performs some speech act, (ii) some propositional attitude is one of the necessary conditions of sincery condition of this act, (iii) x doesn’t have this propositional attitude, (iv) x doesn’t inform y that (iii). We also propose crucial definition of claiming: A person x claims at a context C that p iff there is some sentence S of some language L (which x understands perfectly): (i) x utters S at C, (ii) according to semantic rules of L: uttering at C sentence S means that p, (iii) x is disposed at C to confirm the truthfulness of S. and expressing: A person x by uttering S expresses some kind of propositional attitude that p iff for all who are acquainted with proper linguistic or social convention is reasonable to attribute this kind of propositional attitude that p to x. (shrink)

Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent. According to the orthodox view of counterfactuals, all counterpossibles are vacuously true. This is puzzling because some counterpossible statements seem to be false. The paper analyzes two approaches to explaining why certain counterpossibles, though perhaps true, may appear to be false. The first, which appeals to the Gricean mechanism of conversational implicatures, asserts that some counterpossibles appear to be false because their assertion carries with it a false conversational implicature. However, I argue that, (...) under a closer scrutiny, this approach collapses. I therefore turn to a second approach, proposed by Timothy Williamson. It appeals to a heuristic according to which speakers may regard a counterpossible to be false if they have previously accepted its opposite. Since the applicability of Williamson’s solution is limited, I suggest a more general account. Its underlining idea is that a counterpossible is rejected if the speaker cannot find what they regard as a universally true conditional function derivable from the counterpossible by substitutions and syntactic transformations. (shrink)

The popular interpretation of token‐reflexivism states that at the level of logical form, indexicals and demonstratives are disguised descriptions that employ complex demonstratives or special quotation‐mark names involving particular tokens of the appropriate expression‐types. In this article I first demonstrate that this interpretation of token‐reflexivism is only one of many, and that it is better to think of token‐reflexivism as denoting a family of distinct theoretical frameworks. Second, I contrast two interpretations of the idea of the token‐reflexive paraphrase of an (...) indexical sentence. The utterance approach claims that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of entire utterances. The sub‐utterance approach maintains that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of the particular indexical words used in the utterance. Next, I pose a problem that shows that neither of the two approaches is correct. The problem shows that the only viable version of the token‐reflexive proposition must somehow take into account the referential intentions of the speaker of the context. Therefore I conclude the article by sketching the framework of restricted intentional token‐reflexivism. I argue that it is an attractive semantic theory of distributed utterances that, among other things, enables automatic and intentional indexicals to be distinguished. (shrink)

The Gettier problem concerns the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the paper I argue that Gettier's cases are not cases of justified true belief because Gettier's examples rely on some problematic assumptions. The first is rather elementary definition of justification and the other is that justification is preserved by entailment, that is, (A) for all agents X, if X is justified in believing that p , and X realizes that the truth of p entails the truth of (...) q , then X would also be justified in believing that q . For the simplistic conception of justification has some alarming consequences we pursue more adequate definition of justification which would satisfy the idea that a necessary condition of justification is to entail or to be entailed by a true proposition. We also show that the (A) is not necessary to provide an elegant counter-example to the definition of knowledge if the elementary definition of justification is adopted. (shrink)

According to Adams and his colleagues, fictional sentences, i.e. sentences featuring fictional names, lack any truth value. To explain intuitions to the contrary, they refer to the pragmatics of fictional assertions and claim that sincere utterances of those sentences generate some conversational implicatures. They argue that all who take fictional sentences to have a truth value tend to mistake implicatures of assertions of such sentences with their literal content. The aim of the paper is to show that this argument is (...) not convincing.The challenge being that it doesn’t provide any satisfactory explanation as to what is negated in seemingly genuine disagreement cases in which fictional sentences are asserted. Sentential negation usually doesn’t affect (i.e. negate) a proposition which is conversationally implied, especially when it comes to the manner implicature. And, as I argue, an advocate of the pragmatic defence should maintain that this is the kind of conversational implicature that the assertion of fictional sentences generates. (shrink)

The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym dorobku (...) naukowym [...]. (shrink)

The phenomenon of context dependence is so multifaceted that it is tempting to classify it as hetergenous. It is especially evident in the case of the difference between context dependence as understood in the philosophy of language and context dependence as understood in the philosophy of mind. One of the aims of the present volume is to show that as varied as the phenomenon of context dependence is, the similarities between its different manifestations are profound and undeniable. More importantly, as (...) evidenced in a number of papers presented on the subsequent pages of this volume, a broad perspective on the phenomenon of context dependence helps us to re-apply theories devised for one of the subfields of philosophy to the other subfields. Since the connections and analogies between many uses of contextualism may not be initially obvious, keeping an open perspective and the willingness to learn from the work of others may sometimes be crucial for finding new, satisfactory solutions. (shrink)

Leon Koj napisał w zakończeniu do Problemów semiotyki logicznej, że nie sposób sobie wyobrazić semiotyki w Polsce bez Jerzego Pelca. Można opinię tę rozumieć tak, że Jerzy Pelc wywarł na semiotykę polską wpływ, bez którego to, co w niej najlepsze, nie przybrałoby nigdy formy rozwiniętej, nie ujrzałoby światła dziennego oraz nie znalazłoby odbicia w dydaktyce uniwersyteckiej. Jest to opinia trafna, a rozprawy zawarte w niniejszym – poświęconym Jerzemu Pelcowi – tomie Studiów Semiotycznych są oznakami tego wpływu.

The paper concerns the semantics of belief reports. The following definition is proposed: if rational agent x does not accept any sentence, which is true under x’s interpretation of expressions iff not-p, and x does not reject any sentence, which is true under x’s interpretation iff p, then (x believes that p iff x accepts  which is true under x’s interpretation iff p). The term ‘x’s interpretation of an expression e’ is to be understood: something which x actually refers (...) to by using e (rather than a object she intends to refer). This is to say that to ascribe a belief to rational agent one should use words which have the same reference as words used by the agent. We believe it could solve Krpike’s puzzles about belief on the price that sometimes names used by the agent refer to others entities than when we use them. (shrink)

The paper contains a critical analysis of pluripropositionalism (or: multiple proposition approach), the view defended in recent years by authors such as Eros Corazza, Kepa Korta and John Perry.

The aims of this paper are to provide a detailed taxonomy of noncanonical uses of interrogative sentences, i.e. when they are used not to ask a question but to convey some information, or to ask a question albeit not that expressed by the interrogative sentence exploited in the act, to identify properties of circumstances where an interrogative sentence is being used in this way, and to propose some maxims that govern the rational use of questions. Four main categories of such (...) cases are presented, and a few further subclasses are differentiated. I show how these types are interrelated, and what logical features differentiate them. I also propose a hypothesis for when an interrogative sentence is not being used in its primary mode. Studies on circumstances in which questions are used in other ways can shed light on maxims that govern asking and questioning in a rational conversation; therefore, some possible maxims of this kind are proposed. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen described the difficulties faced by those who claim that statements about possible worlds cannot be literally true. According to his argument, if the truth of modal sentences could be explained by referring to the hypothesis of the plurality of possible worlds, which is a sort of fiction for modal irrealists, the position would have antinomic consequence. I argue that the advocate of broad modal fictionalism can avoid such a devastating conclusion. To that end, her position should be given (...) in meta-language describing the necessary and sufficient conditions of accepting modal sentences as true in terms of fiction of possible worlds. I show that there is a coherent way of reading ‘it is accepted as true’ that allows one to maintain that the disjunction of two mutually contradictory propositions can be accepted without accepting either of them. (shrink)

This volume addresses foundational issues of context-dependence and indexicality, which are at the center of the current debate within the philosophy of language. Topics include the scope of context-dependency, the nature of content and the character of input data of cognitive processes relevant for the interpretation of utterances. There's also coverage of the role of beliefs and intentions as contextual factors, as well as the validity of arguments in context-sensitive languages. The contributions consider foundational issues regarding context-sensitivity from three different, (...) yet related, perspectives on the phenomenon of context-dependence: representational, structural, and functional. The contributors not only address the representational, structural and/or functional problems separately but also study their mutual connections, thus furthering the debate and bringing competing approaches closer to unification and consensus. This text appeals to students and researchers within the field. This is a very useful collection of essays devoted to the roles of context in the study of language. Its essays provide a useful overview of the current debates on this topic, and they put forth novel contributions that will undoubtedly be of relevance for the development of all areas in philosophy and linguistics interested in the notion of context. Stefano Predelli Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. (shrink)

W artykule przedstawiam tzw. chwyt z zasadnej stwierdzalności (WAM) wymierzony w znaną argumentację E. Gettiera, która miała wykazać nieadekwatność tradycyjnej definicji wiedzy. Keith DeRose sformułował trzy warunki poprawności WAM – pokazuję, że zaproponowany w pracy WAM je spełnia. Jeśli zaproponowany sposób wyjaśnienia Gettierowskich przykładów jest poprawny, to konkluzywność argumentacji Gettiera staje się wątpliwa. Jeśli jednak nie jest i przykładów Gettiera nie można wyjaśnić poprzez odwołanie się do generowania fałszywych implikatur konwersacyjnych przez prawdziwe asercje określonych zdań, to warunki poprawności nałożone przez (...) DeRose’a na WAM okazują się niewystarczające. W pracy proponuję więc uzupełnić listę tychże o następujący warunek: jeżeli w określonym kontekście k asercja danego zdania Z ma być nieakceptowalna jedynie ze względu na generowanie w tych okolicznościach fałszywych implikatur i1, ..., in, to asercja tego zdania w każdym innym kontekście k*, która generować będzie w k* dokładnie te same fałszywe implikatury i1, ..., in, ma być również nieakceptowalna (i to w równym stopniu). (shrink)

This article explores the connection between questions and conversational implicatures. We put forward a theoretical argument to the effect that questions can contain such implicatures. We also present extensive empirical material that confirms this hypothesis. The article focuses on a class of utterances used simultaneously to express an epistemic stance toward a state of affairs stated in a subordinate clause and to receive a response from an interlocutor, like in the following example: Don’t you think Peter should be going home (...) now? (shrink)

Przedmiotem pracy są uwagi Jerzego Pelca dotyczące pojęcia kłamstwa i kłamania opublikowane w O pojęciu kłamstwa – z punktu widzenia semiotyki (1990). Przedstawioną w niej definicję kłamania porównuję z warunkami nakładanymi na to pojęcie przez innych autorów. Pokazuję, że zdaniem Pelca, warunek ekstensji przekonań nie jest koniecznym warunkiem na kłamstwo. Dodatkowo, zauważam, iż pewne uwagi Pelca skłaniają do wniosku, że można kłamać implikując coś, co uważa się za fałsz, nie zaś wyraźnie to stwierdzając. Argumentuję, że przyjmowany w analizowanej pracy warunek (...) chęci oszukania adresata jest wątpliwym warunkiem koniecznym kłamania. Ostatecznie, uwzględniając spostrzeżenia Pelca, proponuję następująca definicję: (DEF. Kłamania*) Osoba A kłamie w określonym kontekście K osobie B, że p, zawsze i tylko wtedy, gdy: (1) A posługuje się w K pewnym znakiem Z, zaś zgodnie z pewną przyjętą lub utartą konwencją posłużenie się Z przez A wobec B w K może być zasadnie uznane za twierdzenie przez A wobec B, że p, i (2) A nie uznaje w K, że p, oraz (3) nie powiadamia uprzednio o tym B, albo też (2*) A uznaje w K, że p, ale (3*) zakłada, że pomimo (1) B uzna, że A nie sądzi, że p. (shrink)